Introduction
The journal paper [5] emphasizes the elegant structure of the bistable marriages problem.
That paper also provides the following instance of the stable roommates problem that has the indicated ordinary and reverse solutions: Person # 1 6 3 5 7 8 4 2 2 1 7 4 3 5 8 6 3 5 1 4 7 2 8 6 4 1 5 3 6 7 2 8 5 8 1 7 2 3 4 6 6 3 5 8 2 4 1 7 7 6 1 4 8 3 5 This report describes an approach to this more general bistable roommates problem. In particular, this report uses the two-satisfiability structure of [2, chapter 4] for instances of the stable roomates to pursue a test for the existence of bistable solutions for the roommates problem.
Stable Roommates
The stable roommates problem generalizes the stable marriages problem, since an instance of the stable marriages problem may be reduced to an instance of the stable roommates problem [2, p. 163 ]. The rigorous definition of stability is again based on the notions of preference and blocking pair for a set of n persons p i , 1 < i < n.
i > p j indicates that pair {p, i} is strictly preferred to pair {p, j} by person p.
We say that i is preferred to j if the pair with i is either strictly preferred to the pair with j or i = j.
For a given matching with {i, j} and {k, l}, {i, l} is a blocking pair if l > i j and i > l k.
Stability is the absence of a blocking pair in a matching.
A stable pair is a pair that appears in some stable matching for an instance.
A fixed pair is a pair that appears in all stable matchings for an instance. notably the fact that eliminating an arbitrary exposed rotation will not preclude finding a stable matching. The nature of the rotations will be examined, since they are the means for pursuing bistable matchings. Since the individuals are not distinguished by gender, the definition of rotation is different.
Let first(x), second(x), and last(x) represent the first, second, and last entries, respectively, on person x's reduced preference list (taken after phase-1 or after ''eliminating'' a rotation, to be defined momentarily). For a given set of reduced preference lists, a sequence ρ = (x 0 , y 0 ), (x 1 , y 1 ), . . . (x r-1 , y r-1 ) such that y i = first(x i ) and y i+1 = second(x i ) for each i, 0 < i < r-1, where i+1 is taken modulo r, is called a rotation (exposed) by the preference lists. {x 0 , x 1 , .
. ., x r-1 } is the X-set of ρ and {y 0 , y 1 , . . ., y r-1 } is the Y-set of ρ. As in the case of stable marriage rotations, the sequence of pairs for a rotation may be rotated cyclically without changing the meaning of the rotation. Eliminating an exposed rotation ρ requires the deletion of all pairs {y i , z} such that y i prefers x i-1 to z. The following properties of the preference lists Suppose that ρ = (x 0 , y 0 ), (x 1 , y 1 ), . . . (x r-1 , y r-1 ) and σ are two distinct rotations exposed in the same set of reduced preference lists. Then either ρ remains exposed when σ is eliminated or σ = (y 1 , x 0 ), (y 2 , x 1 ), . . ., (y i , x i-1 ), . . ., (y 0 , x r-1 ).
x 1 ), . . ., (y i , x i-1 ), . . ., (y 0 , x r-1 ) is also a rotation; otherwise r is singular. If ρ and ~ρ are both rotations, then they are known as duals. being non-singular -while processing an instance with the given algorithm, simply refuse to eliminate ρ when it is exposed; if eliminating other rotations (which could include ~ρ) leads to a stable matching, then ρ is non-singular, otherwise it is singular. Even though singular rotations are easily set aside, there is the difficulty that a rotation may not be eliminated until all of its pairs have been introduced by other rotations, i.e. the rotation must be first exposed. Before a rotation ρ may be eliminated, any predecessor π must be eliminated. The notation π < ρ is used to indicate this relationship. Since the predecessor of a rotation may also have predecessors, we will use < to denote the reflexive closure of <. The following observations [2, Lemma 4.3.7] capture the nature of <:
If ρ, σ are non-singular rotations and π is a singular rotation, then If ρ and σ are two rotations exposed in a set of reduced preference lists, then the X-sets of ρ and σ are disjoint, as are their Y-sets.
This result implies that an ordered pair (x, y) is introduced by only one rotation, but (y, x) may be introduced in a different rotation. Thus, ρ < σ will hold whenever ρ introduces an ordered pair that σ eliminates. Since a non-singular rotation is never a predecessor of a singular rotation, we will only be interested in the predecessor structure among the non-singular rotations.
For convenience in manipulating the predecessor structure, observe that the non-singular rotations may be treated as propositional atoms and ρ < σ may be treated as the implication σ ⇒ ρ which may be handled as a clause ~σ ∨ ρ for the 2-satisfiability problem. (Of course, if x < y and y < z, then the transitive x < z may be omitted.) By capturing the entire set of predecessor cases as these clauses, any satisfying assignment also gives a stable matching for the roommates instance by selecting rotation ρ if and only if the corresponding atom is asserted and choosing ~ρ otherwise.
In the introduction, an example of stable roommates with bistable solutions was given.
The rotations, predecessor structure (figures 14 and 15), and 2-satisfiability clauses for the original (forward) preference lists and the reverse (backward) preferences lists are now given.
Note that all rotations, except f2, are non-singular. Backward 2-satisfiability:
Extension of Stable Roommates for Bistability
For bistability we define:
For a given matching with {i, j} and {k, l}, {i, l} is a reverse blocking pair if j > i l and k > l i.
Bistability is the absence of both blocking pairs and reverse blocking pairs in a matching.
Due to a lack of strong structure, such as the distributive lattice for stable marriages, This leads to nine cases to be addressed in extending the set of clauses for bistability.
Since the last situation leads to clauses with 3 literals, the possibility of NP-completeness [4] arises but is left as an open problem. 
Forward Backward
Pair Introducing Rotations Introducing Rotations Case Clauses
By taking the set of clauses including these, along with those for forward and backward rotation Note that the unit clause, b1, for {2, 8} indicates that the ~b1 literals in the 3-clauses for {4, 6}
are not needed, and thus no 3-clauses remain.
Our final result bears a slight resemblance to the lattice closure properties observed for bistable marriages. [2, p.195 ] defines the median choice relative to three stable roommates matchings R 1 , R 2 , and R 3 for a person x as follows: if x has the same partner y in two or three of the matchings, then x's median choice relative to these matchings is y; otherwise if x's partners in the matchings are v, y, and z, and x prefers v to y and y to z, then x's median choice is y. The notion of median is then extended to stable matchings: It is rather obvious that their result extends to bistable matchings:
Theorem 7: If R 1 , R 2 , and R 3 are three distinct bistable roommates matchings, then mapping each person to his median choice relative to R 1 , R 2 , and R 3 gives a bistable matching.
Proof: A person's median choice relative to R 1 , R 2 , R 3 is the same for both orientations of the preference lists, so the same matching will result. 
